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 6 
 Towards a transatlantic community of law? 
 h e use of law between the EU and US legal orders: questions 
of legal form and characterisation 
 Elaine  Fahey  
 Introduction 
 In a review published in 1967 of the textbook by Stein and Hay,  Law and 
Institutions in the Atlantic Area , Angelo opined that ‘the emergent cross-
Atlantic organisations of the 1950’s are suf ering from internal attacks. To 
the casual observer there appears to be more conl ict than law in Atlantic 
institutions … hope for an “Atlantic Community” or even a “partnership” 
seems to be an ever-receding dream.’ 1 Historically, many have doubted 
the feasibility of transatlantic integration through law. h ere is a still a 
discernible view in scholarship about the insignii cance of law to trans-
atlantic relations, as an ‘institutional-light’, ‘law-light’ uni xed scientii c 
entity. However, many distinctive ‘interactions’ and rule-making exer-
cises take place in contemporary times between the EU and US legal 
orders, for example the development of the broad adoption of EU rules 
in the USA, 2 major EU–US rule convergence in data protection, 3 an insti-
tutionalised Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) or 
 h anks to participants at the workshop  Transatlantic Relations: the Nature of Rule-making , 
January 2013, Amsterdam, the Netherlands for comments received there. h anks also to 
Christina Eckes, Pieter Jan Kuijper, Chantal Mak and Anniek de Ruijter for their helpful 
remarks and comments. All errors are solely those of the author. 
 1  H.  Angelo , ‘ Review of E. Stein & P. Hay (eds.) Law and Institutions in the Atlantic Area, 
Readings, Cases, and Problems with Volume of Documents ’ ( 1967 )  56  California Law 
Review  923 . 
 2  A.  Bradford , ‘ h e Brussels Ef ect ’ ( 2013 )  107  Northwestern University Law Review  1 . 
 3  ‘EU urged to choose transatlantic convergence on data protection’,  EurActiv (5 December 
2012). Negotiations on a transatlantic data protection framework agreement began 
in 2010. 
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even the EU intervening frequently before the US Supreme Court. 4 Some 
of these developments are argued here to indicate the institutionalisation 
of transatlantic relations. Others are argued to indicate what is termed 
here as specii c degrees of ‘proximity’ between the EU and US legal orders, 
that is closeness of instruments, structures or interactions, formal and 
informal, more specii cally dei ned than the NATO-esque ‘Atlantic Area’ 
considered by Angelo. h ey (i.e. institutionalisation and close proxim-
ity) raise the question of the relationship between them as phenomena. 
Cumulatively, they form the basis for rel ections here, by way of a future 
research agenda, on what the phenomenon of a ‘transatlantic community 
of law’ between the EU and USA actually means in contemporary times. 
Recent developments also provoke a rel ection on our understanding of 
the character of ‘real world’ interactions between legal orders and perhaps 
questions of their legitimacy. 
 More conventional legal analyses of transatlantic relations examine 
its bilateral agreements  stricto senso , especially in sensitive i elds such as 
security. In this perspective, the more conventional template for analysis 
is the use of mutual recognition and its legitimacy. 5 Arguably, EU–US 
security rule-making at er 9/11 exposed limits of mutual recognition 
in security cooperation or the limits of proximity between legal orders. 
Conversely, it can be argued that more recent forms of EU–US secur-
ity rule-making go beyond mutual recognition, for example EU–US 
ef orts to engage in global rule-making in cybercrime and cyber secur-
ity. 6 Instead, they seem to be the product of the proximity between the 
two legal orders. It remains to be seen at the time of writing how the 
EU–US surveillance saga will impact on this state of af airs. Nonetheless, 
there are many reasons to consider the parameters of proximity between 
the EU and US legal orders, both within and beyond its conventional 
forums. 
 4  On the TTIP, see M. Bartl and E. Fahey ‘A Postnational Marketplace: Negotiating the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),’  Chapter 9 in this volume. On 
EU interventions before the US Supreme Court, see section II. 
 5  See  E.  Fahey , ‘ Law and Governance as Checks and Balances in Transatlantic Security: 
Rights, Redress and Remedies in EU–US Passenger Name Records and the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Program ’ ( 2013 )  32  Yearbook of European Law  1 ;  G.  Shaffer , 
‘ Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Roles: h e Prospects and Limits of New Approaches 
to Transatlantic Governance through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements ’ 
( 2002 )  9  Columbia Journal of European Law  29 . 
 6  EU–US Working Group on cyber-security and cybercrime, Concept Paper, 13 April 2011 
(hereat er WGCC Concept Paper). 
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 Accordingly, this chapter considers these themes using four largely 
descriptive theses. First, it is intended to show in section I, following on 
from accounts in the i rst part of the volume, how interactions between 
the EU and US legal orders demonstrate that transatlantic relations can be 
understood as quasi-institutionalised. h is account explores, in section 
II, how law serves as a medium for communication between the two legal 
orders, sometimes outside of the strictly conventional bilateral context of 
EU–US agreements and conventional dispute resolution forums (termed 
here ‘non-bilateral’), only possible on account of the high quasi-institu-
tionalisation of the relationship or at least very high proximity between 
the two legal orders. However, it is also shown in section III that there are 
boundaries or limitations on this proximity or closeness, and also major 
legitimacy questions. For example, the limitations of mutual recogni-
tion in transatlantic justice cooperation are evident from an analysis of 
bilateral rule-making in security post 9/11. By contrast, in more recent 
times the high proximity between the two legal orders results instead in 
more novel forms of bilateral rule-making, leading to the consideration 
in section IV of the movement of rules between the two legal orders in 
the phenomena of rule-transfer and tentatively considers questions of its 
legitimacy, which warrant future study. 
 I.  h e character of law and transatlantic relations 
 A.  Transatlantic integration through ‘law’: what is ‘ law-light’? 
 Historically, many have sought an ‘Atlantic community of law’, 7 a 
‘Transatlantic Marketplace’ 8 or a ‘Transatlantic Civil Society’ 9 to be 
forged between the EU and USA. Such entities have been mooted with 
a view to creating a transatlantic polity of sorts, inter alia for economic, 
political and even socio-cultural reasons.  h e recent negotiations 
between the EU and USA on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) may signify a new era of legal cooperation between 
 7  See Angelo, ‘Review of Stein and Hay’. 
 8  See L. Britton, ‘Europe: the New Tiger? h e Shape of Tomorrow’s Global Economy’, speech 
delivered at h e Kennedy School, Harvard University, Boston, USA (18 March 1998), 
available at:  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-98-49_en.htm , accessed 12 
February 2014;  M.  Egan (ed.),  Creating a Transatlantic Marketplace: Government Policies 
and Business Strategies ( Manchester University Press ,  2005 ) . 
 9  F.  Bignami and  S.  Charnowitz , ‘Transatlantic Civil Society Dialogues’ in  M.  Pollack and 
 G.  Shaf er (eds.),  Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy ( Lanham :  Rowman & 
Littlei eld ,  2001 ), p. 255 . 
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them, if successful. 10 Nevertheless, most scholars of transatlantic rela-
tions generally express disappointment and pessimism about the tra-
jectory of transatlantic relations through law, particularly in the area of 
trade. h e relationship between the EU and USA is viewed as having gen-
erated many failed agreements, binding and non-binding, ot en caused 
by a lack of compliance from the lead actors and plagued by sub-optimal 
remedies. 11 Moreover, the relationship between the EU and USA is viewed 
by scholars as a ‘law-light’ and ‘institutionally-light’ scientii c entity. 12 
In this regard, relations between the EU and USA have been guided by 
foundational documents such as the Transatlantic Declaration and the 
New Transatlantic Agenda, which are not legally binding. 13 Yet even 
optimistic views of transatlantic cooperation through law are appraised 
by scholars through a language of legal ‘pluralism’ 14 or the limits of ‘rule 
convergence’, 15 language that emphasises a demonstrable political, social 
and cultural space between the two legal orders. What is important to 
 10  See M. Bartl and E. Fahey, ‘A Postnational Marketplace? Negotiating the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’,  Chapter 9 in this volume. 
 11  E. U.  Petersmann , ‘Dispute Prevention and Dispute Settlement in the EU–US Transatlantic 
Partnership’ in  M.  Pollack and  G.  Shaf er (eds.),  Transatlantic Governance in the Global 
Economy ( Lanham :  Rowman & Littlei eld ,  2001 ) ;  M.  Egan , ‘Mutual Recognition and 
Standard Setting: Public and Private Strategies for Governing Markets’ in  M.  Pollack and 
 G.  Shaf er (eds.),  Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy ( Lanham :  Rowman 
& Littlei eld ,  2001 ) ;  E. U.  Petersmann and  M. A.  Pollack (eds.),  Transatlantic Economic 
Disputes. h e EU, the US and the WTO ( Oxford University Press ,  2003 ) ; M. Pollack et al., 
 h e Political Economy of the Transatlantic Partnership , Robert Schuman Centre Report 
(2003), 10; Shaf er, ‘Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Roles’. 
 12  M.  Pollack , ‘ h e New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Rel ections in an Experiment in 
International Governance ’ ( 2005 ) 43  Journal of Common Market Studies  899 . Similarly 
J. Peterson  et al. , ‘Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union 
and the United States: An independent study’, commissioned by European Commission 
Director General External Relations Unit C1 Relations with the United States and 
Canada, 2005. See E. Fahey, ‘On the Use of Law in Transatlantic Relations: Legal 
Dialogues Between the EU and US’,  European Law Journal (forthcoming 2014 20(3)). 
 13  h e New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), signed 3 December 1995 in Madrid. See Pollack 
‘h e New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten’. 
 14  N.  Krisch , ‘ Pluralism in Post-national Risk Regulation: the Dispute over GMOs and 
Trade ’ ( 2010 ) 1  Transnational Legal h eory ; see also  M.  Pollack and  G.  Shaf er ,  When 
Cooperation Fails: h e International Law and Politics of Genetically Modii ed Foods 
( Oxford University Press ,  2009 ) . 
 15  G.  Shaf er , ‘ Globalisation and Social Protection: the Impact of EU and International 
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of US Data Privacy Standards ’ ( 2000 )  25  Yale Journal of 
International Law  1 ;  F.  Bignami , ‘ European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative 
Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining ’ ( 2007 )  48  Boston College Law Review 
 609 ; see also Bradford, ‘h e Brussels Ef ect’. 
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note concerning the role and view of the role of law here is that most 
scholarly views on the conduct of two of the world’s leading global gov-
ernance actors are built upon views of rule-making in the bilateral legal 
context, rather than other autonomous conduct or actions. 16 As a result, 
it is possible to overlook the signii cance of certain interactions taking 
place outside of the conventional bilateral context and their signii cance 
for our understanding of an Atlantic community of law. h e account 
next considers the institutionalisation of the transatlantic relationship 
and its genesis. 
 B.  Institutionalisation and transatlantic relations: why 
‘institution-light’? 
 While there is some dispute in scholarship about the main scientii c char-
acteristics of the relationships between the EU and the USA, few suggest 
that a transatlantic or Atlantic community of law exists. 17 h e ‘institu-
tionally-light’ nature of EU–US relations allied to the novel and inno-
vative capacities that have characterised the transatlantic relationship 
constitutes for some a problematic institutional dei cit,  18 but for others 
a strength. 19 Non-legal scholarship on transatlantic relations is generally 
unambiguous about the extent to which bilateral transatlantic relations 
are institutionally modest. 20 Such scholarship typically demonstrates 
how most transatlantic rule-making has been generated by permanent 
dialogues and by non-institutional actors. However, it can be said from 
a legal perspective that there are formal and informal aspects of trans-
atlantic relations that indicate that they are at least quasi-institutional, 
despite their lack of formal legal character, as explored in  Section 1 of this 
volume. 21  In this regard, a Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue has been 
ongoing since 1972, albeit with limited output and only one of the three 
 16  See, for example,  M.  Smith , ‘h e European Union, the USA and Global Governance’, in 
 J. U.  Wunderlich and  D. J.  Bailey (eds.),  h e European Union and Global Governance A 
Handbook ( London :  Routledge ,  2011 ), Chapter 25 . 
 17  J.  Peterson and  M.  Pollack , ‘Conclusion: h e End of Transatlantic Partnership’ in  J. 
 Peterson and  M.  Pollack (eds.),  Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the 
Twenty-i rst Century : ( London :  Routledge ,  2003 ), p.  128 . 
 18  Pollack, ‘h e New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten’. 
 19  J.  Peterson and  R.  Stef enson , ‘ Transatlantic Institutions: Can Partnership be Engineered? ’ 
( 2009 )  11  British Journal of Politics and International Relations  25 . 
 20  E.g. Pollack, ‘h e New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten’; Peterson  et al ., ‘Review of the 
Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States’. 
 21  As I have argued elsewhere: see Fahey, ‘On the Use of Law in Transatlantic Relations’. 
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EU institutional co-legislators participating. 22  Transatlantic annual sum-
mits have been held since the 1990s, and continue to generate challenges 
regarding the appropriate EU institutional representation, even at er the 
Treaty of Lisbon. 23  Also overlooked in non-legal scholarship is the direct 
contact between the US Supreme Court and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, which has been increasing since 2000 in the form of 
periodic judicial visits. 24 
 Historically, most rule-making between the EU and USA has taken place 
in permanent networks of dialogues. h e permanent dialogues include 
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, Transatlantic Labour Dialogue, 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue and Transatlantic Environment 
Dialogue. h ey have variable degrees of success or failure and comprise 
public and private spheres, variable actors and activities. 25 However, it is 
the Business Dialogue that is claimed to have had the most success as a 
rule-making instrument. 26 In this regard, the democratic credentials of 
transatlantic rule-making are not rated highly per se. h ese dialogues 
are perceived to have given certain economic actors privileged access to 
policy-makers at the expense of other sectors of transatlantic society, an 
assertion that must certainly be the case with respect to the Business 
Dialogue, which include over 100 CEOs of leading US corporations. 27 
Some have categorically stated that no Transatlantic Civil Society per se 
exists, yet there has been much cooperation between civil society across 
the Atlantic for extensive time periods, not least since the nineteenth 
 22  h at is the European Parliament. See D. Jan č i ć , ‘h e European Parliament and EU–US 
Relations: Revamping Institutional Cooperation?’,  Chapter 3 in this volume. 
 23  See  J.  Monar , ‘ EU–US Relations at the Outset of the Obama Presidency: the Potential for 
Leadership and a New Deal ’ ( 2009 )  16  European Foreign Af airs Review  1 ;  P.  Koutrakos 
(ed.),  European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives ( Cheltenham :  Edward 
Elgar ,  2011 ) . See also ‘EU settles on threesome to collect Nobel Peace Prize’,  Reuters.com 
(17 October 2012). 
 24  See E. Mak, ‘h e US Supreme Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union: 
Emergence, Nature and Impact of Transatlantic Judicial Communication,’  Chapter 2 in 
this volume. 
 25  See  M. Green  Cowles , ‘h e Transatlantic Business Dialogue: Transforming the New 
Transatlantic Dialogue’, in  M.  Pollack and  G.  Shaf er (eds.),  Transatlantic Governance 
in the Global Economy ( Lanham :  Rowman & Littlei eld ,  2001 ), p. 215 , on Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue as the most successful dialogue. 
 26  See  ibid . Others suggest that there are also so-called unoi  cial transatlantic dialogues, for 
example on sustainable development, aviation and climate change and policy networks: 
Bignami and Charnovitz, ‘Transatlantic Civil Society Dialogues’, p. 255. However, their 
composition, tasks, operation and proximity to ruke-makers varies considerably and so 
the taxonomy of this category is contestable. 
 27  See Green Cowles, ‘h e Transatlantic Business Dialogue’. 
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century, on topics ranging from peace to slavery. h is category of ‘unoi  -
cial’ dialogues must of course be regarded as more complex, subjective 
and multifarious. 28 Overall, one may say that the prominence of net-
works of actors and dialogues in rule-making sustains the ‘institution-
light’ thesis of transatlantic relations. However, rule-making networks 
between the EU and USA, such as the formal and permanent dialogues 
between the EU and USA, along with High Level Working Groups, are 
subject to increasing standards and expectations of participation and 
transparency, that is EU standards of good governance. 29 h is may oper-
ate to alter the traditional shield of ‘high’ politics surrounding trans-
atlantic relations, which are rooted in its non-institutionalised state. 30 
Whether, beyond this, it will incite further and deeper institutionalisa-
tion remains to be seen. 
 h e question of institutionalisation has ramii cations for our under-
standing of formal legal cooperation between the EU and USA and the 
place of law, legal disputes and interactions between the respective legal 
orders, which are considered here next. 
 C.  On bilateral agreements between the EU and US legal orders and 
the forums for their disputes 
 As a matter of history, relations between the EU and USA have generated 
considerable amounts of high-proi le rather than high-volume conl ict. 31 
 Nevertheless, conl icts generated, for example, through breakdowns in 
agreement and/or challenges to ostensible attempts by both the EU and 
USA to regulate each other extra-territorially have usually taken place in 
conventional forums for the resolution of inter-sovereign disputes, that 
is in the World Trade Organization (WTO), rather than in each other’s 
respective legal order. 32  For example, in the mid 1990s the European 
Community (as it then was) enacted legislative measures to prohibit the 
 28  See Bignami and Charnovitz, ‘Transatlantic Civil Society Dialogues’. 
 29  On transparency, take for example the EU–US dialogue on the peaceful use of space, 
led by the US State Department and the European Commission, which recently fostered 
a long-term cooperation agreement between two organisations, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the European organisation for the 
exploitation of meteorological satellites (EUMETSATA). However, see the meagre pub-
lic information disseminated:  www.euintheus.org/events/signature-ceremony-of-the-
noaa-and-eumetsat-agreement-on-long-term-cooperation/ , accessed 12 February 2014. 
 30  See Bartl and Fahey, ‘A Postnational Marketplace’,  Chapter 9 in this volume. 
 31  Petersmann, ‘Dispute Prevention and Dispute Settlement’. 
 32  See Petersmann and Pollack,  Transatlantic Economic Disputes . 
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extra-territorial application of the US Helms Burton Act, in response to 
legal measures enacted by the USA when Cuba shot down US aircrat , 33 
because it purported to allow legal proceedings be taken against EU citi-
zens and companies involved in the trai  cking of property formerly owned 
by US citizens and coni scated by the Cuban government. h is resulted in 
WTO proceedings, albeit that these are still without a  de jure outcome. 34 
 h ere are several disputes still ongoing between the EU and USA 
before the WTO, relating to breakdowns of agreements between the EU 
and USA.  35  For example, the Boeing-Airbus dispute concerns subsidies 
provided to the companies, initially resulting in an EU–US agreement 
in 1992 on Trade in Large Civil Aircrat . h e USA withdrew from this 
agreement in 2004 on the basis of support given to Boeing and the EU 
followed suit with claims as to support granted to Boeing. h e WTO was 
asked by the EU to rule on countermeasures in 2012 and hearings com-
menced in 2013. 36  Similarly, a poultry dispute has been ongoing since 
1997 relating to the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary measures (so-called SPS measures). h is aside, other 
recent bilateral cooperation between the EU and USA in competition law 
has been spurred by a desire to avoid extra-territorial legislation or direct 
challenges to authority in such forums as the WTO, even if the success 
of this cooperation is complex to measure. 37 Overall, however, we may 
say that disputes between the EU and USA have generally taken place in 
 33  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 OJ L 309/1 (1996), Joint Action of 22 November 1996 
OJ L 309/7 (1996). Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms 
Burton Act) of March 1996, 22 USC §§6021. See  J.  Huber , ‘ h e Helms-Burton Blocking 
Statute of the European Union ’ ( 1996 ) 20  Fordham International Law Journal  699 . 
 34  h e EU requested a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel in 1996 and the EU and USA reached 
an agreement in 1998 not to proceed with its WTO challenge for a quid pro quo under-
taking that the USA would not prosecute any EU citizens under the Act. h e agreement 
reached between the EU and USA was never implemented into US law and a de facto 
truce was reached. See the EC–US Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircrat , OJ L 301 
of 17 October 1992; Appellate Body Report United States – Measures af ecting Trade in 
Large Civil Aircrat , 892 WT/DS353/AB/R (12 March 2012). 
 35  For a recent survey of the European Parliament, see Library of the European Parliament, 
‘Principal EU-US disputes’ (22 April 2013), available at:  www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/bibliotheque/briei ng/2013/130518/LDM_BRI(2013)130518_REV1_EN.pdf 
and  www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds353_e.htm , accessed 12 February 
2014. See Petersmann and Pollack,  Transatlantic Economic Disputes . 
 36  Dispute DS392 United States – Certain Measures Af ecting Imports of Poultry from 
China. 
 37  h e 1991 EC–US Competition Cooperation Agreement provides for both positive and tra-
ditional comity. See  J.  Grii  n , ‘ EC and US Extraterritoriality: Activism and Cooperation ’ 
( 1993 ) 17  Fordham International Law Journal  353 . See the later Agreement between the 
European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the 
9781107060517c06_p129-157.indd   138 3/26/2014   3:41:21 PM
Towards a transatlantic community of law? 139
WTO dispute settlement forums, irrespective of how sub-optimal such 
forums may be in terms of outcomes or bindingness or enforceability. 38 
Moreover, such disputes have not taken place in each other’s legal orders 
generally, neither before the International Court of Justice, nor any other 
international body. Nor have individuals been the benei ciaries or origi-
nators of claims or disputes. h is has operated to contain bilateral dis-
putes in a narrow range of forums of legal activity.  Of course, the advent 
of the TTIP may operate to develop and expand the dispute resolution 
forums between the EU and USA. 
 h is issue of the forum for the litigation of bilateral disputes also raises 
the question as to its relationship to litigation in another forum, namely 
the internal legal orders of the EU and USA respectively. h e account here 
next focuses upon litigation in the EU legal order, thus taking the per-
spective of EU public law. 
 D.  h e litigation of transatlantic relations in the EU legal order 
 An analysis of the legal ef ects of transatlantic measures in the case law of 
the Court of Justice of the EU does not reveal much by way of quantity. 39 
h e limited amount of case law in this regard is indicative of the con-
tours of EU–US relations in respect of representation and rule-making 
networks, that is the actors of bilateral relations, as outlined above. One 
can observe that the rule-making dynamic of transatlantic relations prior 
to the Treaty of Lisbon generated little by way of conl ict between the EU 
institutions and its Member States. 
 A decision of the Court of Justice from 2003 may neatly demon-
strate this point. 40  France v.  Commission serves as a rare challenge by a 
Member State to the authority of the European institutions to enter into 
application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws OJ 
L 173, 18.6.1998, p. 28; Bradford, ‘h e Brussels Ef ect’. 
 38  See on this issue of sub-optimal remedies, see Petersmann, ‘Dispute Prevention and 
Dispute Settlement’. 
 39  A search in the Curia database for ‘transatlantic’, that is EU–US specii c references, yields 
few relevant results. One may more broadly include Case C-233/02  France v.  Commission 
[2004] ECR I-2759 (EC–US Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency); 
Case 142/88  Hoesch AG & Federal Republic of Germany v.  Bergrohr GmbH [1989] ECR 
I-3413 (Arrangement in exchange of letters); Case C-327/91  France v.  Commission [1994] 
ECR I-3641 1991 (EC–US Competition Cooperation Agreement); see the so-called Open 
Skies case law, e.g. C-467/98  Commission v.  Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519; Case C-523/04 
 Commission v.  Netherlands [2007] ECR I–3267. 
 40  Case C-233/02,  France v. Commission [2004]. 
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transatlantic relations prior to the Treaty of Lisbon. In 1998 the EU and 
USA adopted a statement on Transatlantic Economic Partnership, ai  rm-
ing their intention to concentrate on removing barriers to transatlantic 
trade. h e Partnership had an Action Plan approved by the Council in 
November 1998 and negotiations began in 1999 between the Commission 
and US government on principles/guidelines. h e Council had author-
ised the Commission to undertake negotiations with a view to concluding 
a bilateral agreement with the USA in the area of technical barriers to 
trade, and during the negotiations the representatives of the Commission 
maintained that the principles/guidelines could not create any obliga-
tions binding as a matter of international law. By February 2002 the nego-
tiations on the Guidelines on Regulation and Transparency were i nally 
concluded. However, dissatisfaction prevailed in certain Member States 
with the outcome of the negotiations and France brought proceedings 
seeking to annul the decision of the Commission to conclude an agree-
ment with the USA. France contended inter alia that the Commission was 
not competent to adopt the measures as the Guidelines amounted to a 
binding international agreement. By contrast, the Commission argued 
that the Guidelines were not legally binding and that the intention not to 
enter binding legal relations or commitments was expressly maintained 
by the parties throughout the negotiations. Ultimately, the Court held 
that the Guidelines were devoid of legally binding ef ects and that the 
Court would not restrict the right of initiative of the Commission. 
 h e decision may not be regarded as one of any landmark signii cance, 
nor as restrictive of EU authority and EU foreign af airs. Nonetheless, the 
proceedings serve, even if pre-Lisbon, as a reminder of the ability of EU 
Member States to directly challenge the authority of the EU institutions to 
enter formally binding transatlantic relations, which they largely do not 
do. h e proceedings also emphasise how transatlantic relations are strik-
ingly under-litigated. One might observe that the role of the Commission 
in transatlantic relations has been far less contentious than such proceed-
ings might suggest. 
 h e institutional landscape of transatlantic relations post-Lisbon 
involves the Commission still acting as lead EU negotiator of bilateral 
agreements, albeit with the European Parliament having consent powers 
over international agreements, power which has engendered much dis-
cussion on accountability in EU international relations. 41 We may observe 
 41  On Article 218(6)(a) TFEU and other relevant provisions, see Jan č i ć ,  Chapter 3 , and 
Santos Vara,  Chapter 12 , in this volume.. 
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that recent signii cant litigation concerning accountability and transpar-
ency in transatlantic relations has been generated by an individual mem-
ber of the European Parliament before the Court of Justice. 42 Yet previous 
examples of the litigation of transatlantic relations in EU law concern the 
European Parliament, collectively, challenging the validity of the EU–US 
Passenger Name Records Agreement, motivated by rule of law and civil 
liberties concerns. 43 While such questions of the rule of law – and spe-
cii cally accountability questions arising therefrom – are outside of the 
scope of this chapter, this litigation emphasises the layered dynamic of 
who the actors in transatlantic rule-making are. Nonetheless, the ‘insti-
tution-light’ dynamic of transatlantic rule-making coupled with historic-
ally fragmented European external representation has not been causative 
of conl ict through law. Nor has it caused more conventional conl ict with 
the EU Member States themselves. One may conclude that such high pol-
itics is viewed as beyond the realm of justiciability. 44 However, justiciabil-
ity is not necessarily a useful template for analysis given the sheer amount 
of interactions taking place through law outside of bilateral relations. 
 h is account next explores further the forums of and means for inter-
actions between the two legal orders, taking place recently outside of the 
bilateral context in each other’s legal order, which provide a means to 
examine the contours of an Atlantic community of law. 
 II.  Non-bilateral interactions between the EU and US legal orders 
 A.  Overview of recent developments 
 h ere are a series of recent non-bilateral interactions that have taken 
place between the legal orders of the EU and USA and outside of bilateral 
agreements, which the present author has sought to develop as evidence 
of specii c ‘proximity’ between the two legal orders that is not conven-
tionally accounted for. 45  For example, there have been a series of regu-
lar EU  amicus curiae submissions made by the European Commission 
 42  C-350/12 P  In’t Veld v.  Council , Judgment of the General Court of 4 May 2012, [2012] ECR 
II-000, appeal pending. 
 43  Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04  European Parliament v.  Council and Commission 
[2006] ECR I-4721. 
 44  See  E.  Fahey , ‘h e Justiciability of EU PNR SWIFT Law” in  P.  Pawlak (ed.),  Beyond 
Terrorism and Privacy ( Institute for Security Studies , Chaillot Paper,  2012 ) . 
 45  For a detailed account of the case studies sketched briel y in section II.A, see Fahey, ‘On 
the Use of Law in Transatlantic Relations’. 
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through US-based lawyers before the US Supreme Court in, for example, 
death penalty cases, even where the EU had no prior involvement or link 
thereto. h ese submissions were conducted in support of the EU’s long-
standing campaign against the death penalty in the EU. Subsequently, the 
EU submissions were accepted and adopted by the US Supreme Court. 46 
h e submissions were made prior to the advent of single legal personality 
in the Treaty of Lisbon, and notably the authority of the Commission to do 
so on behalf of the EU prior to single legal personality being granted has 
never been challenged by the Member States, who might have favoured 
the Council instead, for example, or indeed no such representation. 47 
 More recently, in late 2012 the European Commission on behalf of the 
European Union made submissions before the US Supreme Court, seek-
ing to prohibit the application of the US Alien Tort Statute to EU compan-
ies for human rights abuses in Nigeria, with less success. 48 
 We may also note that in 2011 the EU took upon itself to include avi-
ation within the scope of EU Environmental Emissions Trading Scheme 
rules, having failed to see an agreement reached at international level. 49 
It thus adopted a series of rules that were perceived to have a consider-
able impact on foreign airlines, even when they were outside EU airspace. 
While further consideration of these events and details has been con-
ducted elsewhere, 50 for present purposes the most signii cant event was 
that the US House of Representatives passed legislation to prohibit the 
impact of EU Environmental Trading Emission (EU-ETS) rules upon 
the US legal order. 51 It also supported the litigation by certain US airlines 
before the Court of Justice to challenge the rule. However, the Court of 
 46  See  M.  Cremona , ‘Values in EU Foreign Policy’ in  M.  Evans and  P.  Koutrakos (eds.), 
 Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest 
of the World ( Oxford :  Hart Publishing ,  2011 ), p.  275 . Interventions accepted in earlier 
rather than later submissions: for example, not in  Sosa v.  Alvarez-Machain , 542 US 692 
(2004), on the Alien Tort Statute. 
 47  Except see  W.  Pryor , ‘ Foreign and International Law Sources in Domestic Constitutional 
Interpretation ’ ( 2006 )  30  Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy  173 , at 174 . 
 48  Kiobel v.  Royal Dutch Petroleum et al , 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013), on the ef ects of inter alia, the 
Alien Tort Statute 28 USC §§1350. 
 49  Directive 2008/101/EC, amending Directive 2003/87/EC. 
 50  See  J.  Scott and  L.  Rajamani , ‘ EU Climate Change Unilateralism ’ ( 2012 )  23  European 
Journal of International Law  469 ;  E.  Fahey , ‘ h e EU Emission Trading Scheme and the 
Court of Justice: the High Politics of the Indirect Promotion of Global Standards ’ ( 2012 ) 
 13  German Law Journal  1247 . 
 51  See Case C-366/10  Air Transport Association of America v.  Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change [2011] ECR I-000. See also the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011 (HR 2594). 
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Justice rejected the challenge, making no reference to the US legislation 
in its decision. Nonetheless, the decision of the Court is widely regarded 
as a landmark ruling on the limitations of regulation and global govern-
ance. In particular, it exposed the transatlantic divide on the boundar-
ies of such regulation and governance. Additionally, however, it exposed 
both the indirect and direct nature of interactions between the EU and 
US legal orders. 
 Many now study the phenomenon of EU–US ‘rule-transfer’ 52 epitomised 
recently in the account of Bradford on the so-called ‘Brussels ef ect’. 53 h is 
phenomenon involves charting a vast transfer of EU regulatory standards 
into the US legal order, in areas ranging from genetically modii ed foods, 
antitrust rules and data privacy standards to chemical safety rules. Some 
suggest that the EU has indirectly forced such rule-transfer onto the USA 
on account of its market size and force. 54 Others suggest that it is a far less 
obvious and more nuanced process of rule-transposition. 55 Nevertheless, 
we may note that the extent to which EU legal rules are actually trans-
posed into US law is increasing, in whole or in part: for example, the par-
tial transposition of EU environmental rules 56 in California, Maine and 
Boston State law, because of the desirability of these rules. 57 h is particu-
lar ‘transfer’ phenomenon is developed in greater detail in section IV. 58 
 In addition, the USA recently intervened informally and anonymously 
in the formulation of EU Data Protection legislation against the backdrop 
of the EU and US negotiations on a General Data Protection Regulation 
that had been taking place since 2010. 59  Furthermore, a more coherent 
 52  On the use of this term, see section IV. 
 53  Bradford, ‘h e Brussels Ef ect’. 
 54  Ibid . 
 55  See e.g.  J.  Scott , ‘ Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law ’,  62  American 
Journal of Comparative Law , available at:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2276433 , accessed 12 
February 2014. 
 56  ‘Reach Regulation’: Council Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 amending Directive 1999/45/
EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 793/93 and Commission Regulation 
(EC) No. 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directive 
91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC. 
 57  J.  Scott , ‘ From Brussels with Love: h e Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the 
Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction ’ ( 2009 )  57 (4)  American Journal of Comparative Law 
 897 ; see also US Government Accountability Oi  ce,  Chemical Regulation. Comparison 
of U.S. and Recently Enacted European Union Approaches to Protect against the Risks of 
Toxic Chemicals (August 2007). 
 58  See section IV. 
 59  ‘Informal Note on Drat  EU General Data Protection Regulation’ (December 2011), avail-
able at:  http://edri.org/i les/12_2011_DPR_USlobby.pdf , accessed 12 February 2011. See 
also ‘US Lobbying waters down EU data protection reform’,  Euractiv.com (21 February 
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EU foreign policy post-Lisbon is asserted to have given rise to a more 
ready ‘harmonisation’ of EU law vis- à -vis US foreign policy, for exam-
ple in relation to secondary sanctions applied to Iran. 60 Such interactions 
demonstrate the signii cance of examining the use of law outside of the 
conventional bilateral context and the dimensions of the phenomenon of 
proximity between legal orders, which signii cance is developed further 
in the next section. 
 B.  Why are non-bilateral interactions of signii cance? 
 h e next question to probe is why these interactions are of signii cance 
to the present account.  One might begin by noting that the submissions 
made by the EU before the US Supreme Court in death penalty cases show 
the EU indirectly engaging in rule-making in the USA using US institu-
tions as the forum for their intervention. In this way, the intervention by 
the EU in formal court proceedings constitutes ‘compliant’ conduct on 
the part of the EU with the authority of the US legal order in order to fur-
ther its own policy goals before a judicial forum. On account of the prom-
inence of this forum, participation by the EU in it has a global impact and 
allows the EU to impart its message broadly.  In the same vein, the use of 
legislation in the EU-ETS dispute and the deployment of EU institutions 
and procedures by political actors supported by their government both 
within and outside their own legal system is a distinctive form of inter-
action between legal orders. h e US legislation was not binding upon the 
EU and had no authority in the EU legal order. Nevertheless, there was a 
compliance with the EU legal order, or its legal procedures through the 
initiation of litigation in its legal order. 
 h e ‘Brussels ef ect’ indicates practices of l exible ‘rule-transfer’, rule 
convergence or rule migration between legal orders. 61 As a result, we may 
observe the malleability of the space between the EU and US legal orders 
to accommodate direct and indirect variants thereof. More concretely, it 
demonstrates the openness of transatlantic relations to each other’s legal 
2012); ‘Informal Comment on the drat  General Data Protection Regulation and drat  
Directive on data protection in law enforcement investigations,’ available at:  www.edri.
org/i les/US_lobbying16012012_0000.pdf , accessed 12 February 2011. 
 60  See the analysis of EU–US relations in the several accounts given in  ‘ Developments in the 
Law – Extraterritoriality ’ ( 2011 ) 124  Harvard Law Review  1226 . See also Memorandum of 
Understanding concerning the US Helms-Burton Act and US Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act, EU–US, 11 April 1997, 36 ILM 529. 
 61  See further in section IV. 
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norms. In the case of data transfer, the informal or unoi  cial advocacy by 
non-specii c US agencies in the EU legislative process resulted in detailed 
input into EU rules. h ese unoi  cial interventions, in the non-bilateral 
context, are not legally binding yet provide evidence of entry points into 
formal rule-making processes so as to pursue their law-making object-
ives. EU foreign policy responsiveness to the US remains in the realm 
of high politics. However, similar to the Brussels ef ect, it also indicates 
that empirically a high degree of proximity actually exists between the 
legal orders. h e interactions demonstrate the centrality of the use of law 
by many actors in various institutional locations between the EU and 
US legal orders in recent times, including at the highest possible levels, 
beyond mere diplomacy. 
 We may say that, evidently, direct and indirect legal dialogues, both oi  -
cial and formal or unoi  cial and informal, between the EU and USA are 
observable outside of the conventional bilateral context of Transatlantic 
Relations, a contention supported and sustained by the i ndings of Mak in 
 Chapter 2 of this volume. h e actual locations of these interactions, how-
ever diverse, are particularly distinctive for a number of reasons. We may 
note that the EU does not usually communicate its norms using advocacy 
in third-countries last instance courts. Rather, the EU usually communi-
cates its norms or engages in the promotion of its norms, such as the rule 
of law and the promotion of fundamental rights, in clauses of agreements 
with neighbouring countries, candidate countries and trade partners. 62 
 Alternatively, the EU issues local statements: for example, in Gaza the EU 
recently expressed its views on the local use of the death penalty in a public 
statement. 63 More usually, the promotion of EU norms is usually commu-
nicated to the subjects and objects of the agreement with legal authority 
and by agreement, albeit that it rarely enforces its suspension rights for 
breach thereof in the context of trade. 64 And overall, we may say that the 
 62  For example, European Commission, Inventory of Agreements containing the Human 
Rights Clause, DG RELEX/B2 – Treaties Oi  ce, 7 July 2011, available at:  http://ec.europa.
eu/world/agreements/viewCollection.do , accessed 12 February 2014. 
 63  For a list of locally issued EU views on the death penalty, see the website of the EEAS, 
available at:  http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/adp/index_en.htm , accessed 12 
February 2014. 
 64  See  B.  De Witte , ‘h e EU and International Legal Order: h e Case of Human Rights’ 
in  M.  Evans and  P.  Koutrakos (eds.),  Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy 
Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World ( Oxford :  Hart Publishing , 
 2011 ), p. 127, at p. 143 ; L. Pech, ‘Rule of Law as a Guiding Principle of the European 
Union’s External Action’, 2012/3 CLEER Working Paper;  M.  Cremona , ‘ h e Union as a 
Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity’ ( 2004 )  41  Common Market Law Review  553 . 
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EU does not usually communicate its norms in the legal orders of these 
countries in the same way that it does with the USA. Instead, it usually 
communicates formally with third countries, through clauses of specii c 
agreements. h e EU also maintains a transparent treaty register, where 
it formally categorises the types of norms that it promotes in its external 
relations. 65 h is renders its communications with the USA all the more 
distinct, less routine and less conventionally formal. h e interactions are 
not limited to specii c formal legal instruments, for example bilateral legal 
agreements between sovereign actors. h ey are thus taking place outside of 
conventional bilateral constraints, practices and legal instruments. 
 One specii c example from practice possibly demonstrates the reasons 
for such non-bilateral interactions and ties together the strands of the out-
line developed in sections I and II.  As noted above, in 2012 the European 
Commission made  amicus curiae submissions on behalf of the European 
Union in proceedings before the US Supreme Court, as did two EU Member 
States, concerning the extra-territoriality application of the US Alien Tort 
Statue to European companies. 66 However, this practice is striking as one 
might have thought that, post-Lisbon, only the EU would intervene as the 
main external institutional representative, whereby it would through the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) negotiate a position in accord-
ance with the views of its Member States, which would be advocated by 
the European Commission on behalf of the EU alone. 67 One can say that 
the institutional evolution of EU external relations post-Lisbon does not 
appear to have limited EU Member State interventions through law before 
the US Supreme Court in recent times, in order to propose a pan-Euro-
pean perspective. h e prevailing l uidity of the (institutional) status quo 
might simply be said then to incite the EU to directly take action in the US 
legal order using law to obtain a desirable outcome in the political process, 
conducted outside of the conventional bilateral processes. 
 h e above sections have considered the character of bilateral relations, 
institutionalisation and forums for interactions between the EU and USA 
(in section I), explored the idea of non-bilateral interactions between legal 
orders (in section II) and examined proximity between the EU and US 
legal orders in various ways. h e next section explores the limits of prox-
imity between the EU and US legal orders in the area of bilateral justice 
and home af airs. 
 65  See n. 62. 
 66  In  Kiobel v . Royal Dutch Petroleum (i.e. Netherlands, United Kingdom). 
 67  Interviews by the author conducted in late 2012 indicate that EEAS oi  cials, particularly 
individuals regularly used to making submissions before the US Supreme Court, were 
not aware of the submissions being made by the individual Member States. 
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 III.  Transatlantic bilateral rule-making in justice and home af airs: 
the character of law 
 A.  Overview 
 Transatlantic security cooperation received its most prominent rule-
making impetus at er the September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, when 
a rat  of EU–US Justice and Home Af airs Agreements were enacted. 68 
Rule-making from this particular period may be considered to demon-
strate the limitations of mutual recognition of each other’s legal order or 
the shortcomings of adequacy presumptions in law. 69 Over a decade at er 
9/11, cooperation is ongoing and also planned in new areas, for example 
cyber security and cybercrime, with a striking shit  in legal form. Even 
if the impetus for terrorism legislation in the transatlantic context has 
abated, the ef ectiveness of transatlantic rule-making has been lauded 
as a reason to engage in transatlantic ‘rule-convergence’ in data protec-
tion. Moreover, this rule-making has inspired the EU to engage in ‘rep-
lica’ rule-making of policies, programmes and agreements. 70 h e recent 
National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance saga has placed EU–US 
Justice and Home Af airs cooperation centre stage once more. 71 h ese 
developments invite an analysis of the character of law in contemporary 
rule-making. 
 68  See J. Santos Vara, ‘Transatlantic Counterterrorism Cooperation Agreements on the 
Transfer of Personal Data: A Test for Democratic Accountability in the EU,  Chapter 12 , 
and V. Mitsilegas, ‘Transatlantic Counterterrorism Cooperation and European Values: 
h e Elusive Quest for Coherence’,  Chapter 13 in this volume. See K. Archick, ‘EU–US 
Cooperation Against Terrorism’, Congressional Research Service 7-5700 (21 May 2012); 
Fahey, ‘Law and Governance as Checks and Balances’. 
 69  See Fahey, ‘Law and Governance as Checks and Balances’; Shaf er, ‘Reconciling Trade 
and Regulatory Roles’; M. Cremona, ‘Justice and Home Af airs in a Globalised World: 
Ambitions and Reality in the Tale of the EU–US SWIFT Agreement’, Institute for 
European Integration Research Working Paper No. 4/2011. 
 70  For example, Proposal for a Directive on the Use of Passenger Name Record Data for 
the prevention, detection investigation and prosecution of terrorist of ences and seri-
ous crime, COM(2011)32, Commission Communication, ‘ A European Terrorist Finance 
Tracking System Available Options ,’ COM(2011)429 i nal. See Mitsilegas,  Chapter 13 in 
this volume. 
 71  See ‘EU–US Counterterrorism pacts at risk over snooping af air’,  EUObserver.com 
(5 July 2013); ‘MEPs raise suspension of EU–US bank data deal’, LIBE Press release 
(24 September 2013), available at:  www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/
content/20130923IPR20604/html/MEPs-raise-suspension-of-EU-US-bank-data-deal , 
accessed 12 February 2014. See also Intervention of Commissioner Malmstroem during 
this event on the use of TFTP dispute resolution clauses. 
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 h e legal form of rights, redress and remedies in such rule-making is 
indicative of a particular imbalance of powers in transatlantic relations in 
this period, borne out in many accounts. 72 A particular agreement may be 
underpinned by formulations of mutual recognition of each other’s legal 
order: access to it and assumed and expressed similarities. Mutual recog-
nition in justice inevitably involves the acceptance of aspects of the con-
tent and form of the legal system of another legal order. h is phenomenon 
has proven to be particularly complex amongst the EU Member States 
themselves, where mutual recognition in justice is recognised as having 
both substantive and procedural components. 73 However, the imbalance 
evident overall arguably rel ects the impossibilities of actual transatlantic 
mutual recognition in justice. 
 By way of illustration, two of the most prominent agreements entered 
into by the EU with USA in the post 9/11 period, designed to communi-
cate air passenger data and to target the i nancing of terrorism, are the 
EU–US Passenger Name Records (EU–US PNR) Agreement and EU–US 
Terrorist Financial Tracking Programme (EU–US TFTP) Agreement, a 
phenomenon considered here next. 74 h ese two agreements have gener-
ated much controversy on account of their limitations on redress and 
their uneven application of US law to EU citizens, not enabling the lat-
ter to fully realise their rights to redress and review. h e formulation of 
the character of rights, remedies and redress is distinctively replicated in 
both agreements in a broad time frame, extending well at er a decade post 
9/11. 75 h eir genesis and operation is exhaustively analysed here in Part 
 72  See further Fahey, ‘Law and Governance as Checks and Balances’; Mitsilegas,  Chapter 13 
this volume.  B.  De Witte , ‘Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union‘s 
Foreign Relations?’ in  B.  De Witte and  M.  Cremona (eds.),  EU Foreign Relations Law: 
Constitutional Fundamentals ( Oxford :  Hart Publishing ,  2008 ), p.  11 ; Cremona, ‘Justice 
and Home Af airs in a Globalised World’. 
 73  See Shaf er, ‘Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Roles’;  V.  Mitsilegas , ‘ Constitutional 
Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU ’ ( 2006 )  43  Common 
Market Law Review  1277 . 
 74  See Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the 
use and transfer of Passenger Name Record Data to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security of 17 November 2011; COM (2011) 807 i nal, approved by the 
European Parliament in April 2012 (hereat er EU–US PNR Agreement); Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
Transfer of Financial Messaging data from the European Union to the United States 
for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, OJ L 195 (hereat er TFTP 
Agreement). 
 75  On the background to the EU–US PNR Agreement see Santos Vara,  Chapter 12 in this 
volume, and Fahey, ‘Law and Governance as Checks and Balances’. 
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III of this volume and this account conducts a particularly brief analysis 
of only specii c aspect of one such agreements as a result. 
 The most recent so-called ‘Second Generation’ EU–US PNR 
Agreement was intended to represent. Over a decade at er 9/11, an 
improved agreement with the USA to transmit air passenger data to the 
USA in the name of i ghting serious crime and terrorism, 76 but remains 
very similar in form and in substance to ‘First Generation’ EU–US 
PNR Agreement. h e Second Generation Agreement now provides 
for a default ‘push’ system in Article 15 thereof, with a ‘pull’ system 
provided for in exceptional circumstances in Article 15(5), indicating 
that the legal character of the Agreement still is signii cantly disposed 
towards US concerns. 
 In the EU–US PNR Agreement rights of redress, access to personal 
information and rights of correction and rectii cation are provided in 
Articles 11–13. Article 13 expressly provides that any individual, regard-
less of nationality, country of origin or place of residence, whose personal 
data and personal information has been processed and used in a manner 
inconsistent with that agreement, may seek ef ective administrative and 
judicial redress in accordance with US law. Moreover, it provides that any 
individual is entitled to seek to administratively challenge Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) decisions related to the use and processing of 
US law. EU citizens can petition for judicial review under an express list 
of US Acts in Article 13(3), including the Freedom of Information Act, 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act. However, the US Privacy Act of 1974 is not one of the listed 
acts and is an intentional and signii cant omission, limited as it is to US 
citizens only. h is thus deprives EU citizens of important legal protec-
tions. h e agreement provides in Article 14, simply entitled ‘Oversight’, 
that compliance with privacy safeguards in the agreement will be sub-
ject to independent review and oversight by Department Privacy Oi  cers, 
such as the DHS Privacy Oi  cer, expressed to have a ‘proven record of 
autonomy’, who will exercise inter alia ‘ef ective powers of oversight, 
investigation, intervention and review’. In turn, the agreement expresses 
 76  Improving upon the Agreement between the European Community and the United 
States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the 
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection ([2004] OJ L 183/ 83, and corrigendum at [2005] OJ L 255/168); Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), OJ 2007 L 204/18. 
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itself to be subject to independent review and oversight by the DHS Oi  ce 
of the Inspector General, the Government Accountability Oi  ce and the 
US Congress. h us considerable administrative discretion is accorded 
to a variety of US agencies that are checked in turn by further agencies 
and government. h e extent to which an EU citizen will be in a position 
to challenge their ef ectiveness seems problematic. Moreover, Article 21 
expressly provides that the agreement shall not inter alia create any right 
or benei t for any person, arising from the standpoint of the USA in nego-
tiations that the agreement would not create new rights under US law. 77 
h is reinforces how mutual recognition or equivalence seems far from 
apparent in this area. 
 A critical view of the evolution of the EU–US PNR Agreement may be 
readily adopted, given that the expressed improvements of the agreement 
appear as piecemeal changes without any fuller integration of the two legal 
orders. Overall, the formulation of rights and remedies therein appears 
singularly dei cient for EU citizens, even when expressed to the contrary. 
h e specii c character of legal rights in the EU–US PNR Agreement is 
especially novel and qualii ed but arguably highly imbalanced as regards 
EU citizens. In this way, the use of law in transatlantic relations is reveal-
ing as much about the proximity between the legal orders as the state of 
transatlantic relations in the post 9/11 era, even a decade thereat er. h e 
controversy of NSA surveillance in 2013 put the spotlight on their dei -
ciencies and structural imbalances once again. 
 However, newer forms of bilateral cooperation of er an alternative per-
spective on justice and home af airs in transatlantic relations, for example 
in the area of EU–US cybercrime and cyber security, which is the latest 
form of transatlantic bilateral security cooperation. h ey of er a dif erent 
perspective on the boundaries of bilateral cooperation precisely because 
they indicate closeness between the legal orders. h ey are much more 
indicative of the contours of what might be understood in contemporary 
terms as an ‘Atlantic community of law’, explicable alongside the many 
non-bilateral interactions through law identii ed here. 
 B.  EU–US cybercrime and cyber security cooperation 
 h e latest transatlantic cooperation in justice and home af airs is in cyber-
crime and cybersecurity, in the form of the EU–US Working Group on 
 77  See EU-US data protection negotiations during 2011, Council doc. 5999/12, Annex note 
from Commission DG Justice. 
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Cybercrime and Cybersecurity (WGCC), which was established at er the 
EU–US Summit in November 2010. 78  However, the origins of this cooper-
ation date back a decade earlier to the Joint EC-US Task Force on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection. 79  Also around this time the Council of Europe 
Cybercrime Convention was adopted, which now forms a central legal 
element of EU–US cooperation as well as internal EU rule-making in this 
i eld. 80 h e EU–US cooperation goals are predominantly in four areas: 
(1) the expansion of cyber incident management response capabilities 
jointly and globally, through a cooperation programme culminating in 
a joint-EU–US cyber-incident exercise by the end of 2011; (2) to broadly 
engage the private sector using public–private partnerships, sharing good 
practices with industry and to launch a programme of joint awareness-
raising activities; (3) to remove child pornography from the Internet; 
and (4) to advance the international ratii cation of the Council of Europe 
Convention by the EU and Council of Europe Member States and to 
encourage pending non-European countries rapidly to become parties. 
 From its distinctive legal objectives, it seems apparent that the WGCC 
had i rst and foremost ‘global’ rule-making objectives. h e WGCC 
Group mentions specii c countries to be ‘encouraged’ to become par-
ties to the Convention, countries within and outside the EU. 81  However, 
while during 2012 Belgium, Malta and Austria ratii ed it, there are sev-
eral EU Member States still ‘resisting’ ratii cation on various grounds. 
In this regard, of note is that the USA is not a member of the Council of 
Europe but took part in the drat ing of the Convention and has signed 
and ratii ed it. Also of note is that in 2008 the European Commission 
suggested that its redrat ing or modernisation had become unachiev-
able, but nonetheless promoted both international and EU ratii cation, 
as it currently does. 82  Another notable and global-esque expected goal 
of EU–US cooperation includes the endorsement of EU–US ‘delivera-
bles’ in cybercrime by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), a notable US-based entity engaging in signii cant 
postnational rule-making. 83 And further evidence of the nature of the 
‘global’ objectives of rule-making and policy development is provided by 
 78  WGCC Concept Paper, Annex 1. 
 79  ‘Creating a safer Information Society by improving the security of information infra-
structures and combating computer related crime’, COM(2000)890 i nal. 
 80  See  Cyber-security Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace , 
JOIN(2013)1i nal, Brussels (7 February 2013). 
 81  WGCC Concept Paper, 4.   82  COM(2010) 517 i nal, 2. 
 83  WGCC Concept Paper, 3. 
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the minutes of a 2011 meeting of EU–US Senior JHA Oi  cials, where it 
was stated that the EU and USA would work together in the UN to avoid 
dilution of the body of international law on cybercrime. 84 Similarly, the 
European Commission has been oriented towards global-like object-
ives, seeking global cyber security policies before its own internal policy 
at EU level had been conceived. 85 And well in advance of the adoption 
by the EU of its internal rule-making objectives in this area, in particu-
lar its Cyber-security Strategy published only in 2013 and thus at er the 
EU–US cooperation,  the European Parliament in 2012 advocated an EU 
framework on cyber security, with a view to the policy being ‘brought 
up’ at G8 and G20 level. 86 
 h is latest EU–US cooperation may be said to indicate new boundaries 
in the transatlantic relationship on account of their global rule-making 
ambitions, notwithstanding i rst, formal limitations on the conduct of the 
USA as an actor outside of the Council of Europe and second, the unwill-
ingness of certain EU Member States to cooperate in bilateral rule-mak-
ing. 87 h ere are of course other precedents for the USA acting as a vocal 
and active observer, even if it is not a member of a specii c international 
organisation.  For example, in the Convention on Biodiversity, whilst only 
an observer, the USA still played a major role in the drat ing process of a 
Protocol, so as to ensure a particular relationship of the Convention with 
WTO law. 88 Yet it is the regional territorial limits or boundaries of the 
Council of Europe as an organisation in addition to its regional goals as 
an organisation, 89 juxtaposed alongside the goals of the EU and US cyber 
 84  ‘Summary of Conclusions of the EU–US JHA Informal Senior Oi  cials Meeting of 25–26 
July,’ Council Doc. 13228/11, p. 3. 
 85  See ‘Critical Information Infrastructure Protection – Achievements and Next Steps: 
Towards Global Cyber-security,’ COM (2011)163 i nal. 
 86  See the account in ‘Parliament demands single EU voice on cyber-security’,  EUObserver.
com , 13 June 2012. 
 87  See the European Commission’s advocacy of the Convention, emphasising how the 
Convention had been signed by 25 out of the 27 Member States and ratii ed by only 15 
of them: COM(2010) 517 i nal, p. 2. See the ratii cation table at:  http://conventions.coe.
int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG , accessed 12 
February 2014. 
 88  E.g., the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and process of the adop-
tion of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention. See  N.  Krisch ,  Beyond 
Constitutionalism: h e Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law ( Oxford University Press , 
 2010 ), p. 194 . 
 89  On the objectives of the Council of Europe, which specii cally identify its Member 
States as its objects, see its website  www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=nosObjectifs , 
accessed 12 February 2014. 
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cooperation, that indicate the irrelevance of territory. Instead, it suggests 
considerable proximity between the legal orders using law. h e WGCC 
indicates that the boundaries of traditional bilateral cooperation are not 
i xed, that their rule-making objectives form a striking context of cooper-
ation beyond the nation state. h e goals of the WGCC suggest that they 
will lead eventually to the adoption of a global-like cyber policy or at the 
very least global standard-setting, through their promotion of the pri-
macy of external norms. 
 In conclusion, unlike earlier bilateral rule-making, this newer rule-
making appears to have joint-shared ‘global’ objectives. An imbalance 
in legal form is not apparent – the current bilateral legal goals are not 
weighted or disposed towards the USA. Instead, this newer bilateral rule-
making is distinctive because it does not seek to engage in mutual recog-
nition in justice and home af airs but rather has ‘larger’ global-like legal 
goals. While there are specii c curiosities to these goals, particularly when 
contrasted with the EU-ETS rule-making, a newer era of greater proxim-
ity between the two legal orders seems apparent. Whether the latest saga 
of NSA/PRISM surveillance will alter this remains to be seen. 
 Section IV considers the phenomenon of rule-transfer between the EU 
and US legal orders and its relation to the idea of proximity in transatlan-
tic rule-making considered here throughout. h is section draws from one 
specii c case study in justice and home af airs, thus developing the themes 
considered in in section III. 
 IV.  Transatlantic rule-transfer: the ef ects of the bilateral 
relationship in justice and home af airs 
 As outlined briel y above in section II, there is an emerging legal scholar-
ship on actual rule-transfer, that is the movement of rules between legal 
orders, from the EU legal order to the US legal order, which suggests that 
it is far-reaching and widespread. h e so-called ‘Brussels ef ect’ is the 
subject of recent US-based scholarship, assessing the perceived ‘spill-
over’ ef ect of EU regulatory standards on US rules. 90 Equally, accounts 
consider the extent to which EU legal rules are actually transplanted 
or physically replicated in the USA is increasing – for example, EU 
environmental rules. 91 h ese (legal) accounts conceptualise the actual 
 90  Bradford, ‘h e Brussels Ef ect’; Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in 
EU Law’; Scott, ‘From Brussels with Love’; Shaf er, ‘Globalisation and Social Protection’; 
Bignami, ‘European Versus American Liberty’. 
 91  Scott, ‘From Brussels with Love’. 
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transfer of rules from the EU to the USA. Of course, this phenomenon 
may bear some similarities to the concept of a legal transplant, a prin-
ciple of comparative law, where a rule is transplanted into another legal 
order, dif erent to its country of origin. 92 Moreover, there is also a body 
of non-legal scholarship describing the dif usion of values from the EU 
to the US legal order, focusing more upon the reasons for this dif u-
sion rather than the process itself or its conceptualisation. However, this 
scholarship is not couched in terms of rule-transfer or less still trans-
position. 93 Nor does such scholarship focus upon legal aspects of the 
process of rule-transfer. 
 Rule-transfer may thus be described a means or process by which legal 
rules are adopted in other legal orders. It is a term deployed in non-legal 
scholarship on governance and policy development, ot en focusing upon 
the reasons for the adoption of rules or promotion of the adoption of rules 
by the EU. 94 However, while it has a central and distinctive legal compo-
nent as a concept, given that it depicts legal rules and/or legislative meas-
ures, it is not so conceptually i xed or certain. h is process of the adoption 
of EU rules elsewhere, particularly in the USA, is sometimes referred 
to as ‘rule-transfer’, ‘sideways rule-transfer’ or ‘rule-migration’. 95 Such 
accounts conceptualise the actual transfer of rules from the EU to the 
USA, and less so the process, and of er limited normative explanations 
other than economic power or alternatively assume a ‘horizontality’ in 
the legal relationship between the two legal orders without of ering a nor-
mative perspective thereon. 96 Moreover, some draw a distinction between 
 92  See  H. P.  Glenn ,  Legal Traditions of the World , 4th edn ( Oxford University Press , 
 2010 ) . 
 93  D.  Bach and  A.  Newman , ‘ Self-Regulatory Trajectories in the Shadow of Public Power: 
Resolving Digital Dilemmas in Europe and the United States ’ ( 2004 )  17  Governance 
 387 ;  W.  Rees and  R.  Aldrich , ‘European and US Approaches to Counterterrorism’ in  R. 
 Tiersky and  E.  Jones (eds.),  Europe Today: A Twenty-First Century Introduction , 3rd edn 
( Lanham :  Rowman & Littlei eld ,  2007 ), p.  437 ;  Z.  La ï di , ‘European Preferences and their 
Reception’ in  Z.  La ï di (ed.),  EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World. Normative Power 
and Social Preferences ( London and New York :  Routledge ,  2008 ), p.  1 . 
 94  See, for example, its use without any formal dei nition by  F.  Schimmelfennig and  U. 
 Sedelmeier , ‘ Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries 
of Central and European Europe ’ ( 2004 )  11  Journal of European Public Policy  669 . See 
 M.  Rousselin , ‘ But Why Would h ey Do h at? European External Governance and the 
Domestic Preferences of Rule Importers ’ ( 2012 )  8  Journal of Contemporary European 
Research  470 , examining the reasons for the process of rule transfer. 
 95  Bradford, ‘h e Brussels Ef ect’; Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU 
Law’; Scott, ‘From Brussels with Love’. 
 96  See Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law’. 
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the EU’s transfer of legal rules and governance practices externally. 97 In 
doing so, some argue that rule-transfer constitutes an exportation of 
rules. However, this is not necessarily the case, given that it implies only 
the form of development discussed here next. Others dei ne transnational 
law itself as the ‘migration of norms, rules and models across borders’, 98 
distinguishing ‘rule mimicry’, which takes place out of ‘convenience’ or 
because of the economic weight of the rules from ‘rule dif usion’, based 
upon market dominance of sets of rules in a jurisdiction. However, this 
arguably blurs the conceptual and the methodological question of why 
rule-transfer occurs and is rooted in assumptions about the normative 
character of transnational law. 99 
 h e impact of transatlantic rules upon and in the EU legal order is 
argued here to be relevant to the theorisation of rule-transfer, as a useful 
means to consider the place of and phenomena of law in transatlantic rela-
tions.  For example, there are several EU security policies being pursued 
that have clear imprints of EU–US policies: for example, an EU Passenger 
Name Records Directive and an EU Terrorist Finance Tracking System, 
mirroring in form, context and lexicon the EU–US PNR Agreement and 
EU–US TFTP Agreement. 100 We may observe that EU ‘internal’ security 
readily embraces ‘external’ transatlantic security. Put another way, EU 
security rules under development may be said to demonstrate the migra-
tory ef ects of EU–US legal rules by way of some form of rule transpos-
ition or ‘rule-transfer’. Moreover, the adoption of transatlantic measures 
in EU law, particularly in a more stringent format, may be evidence of 
the highly l uid importation and exportation of values. h e EU frequently 
imports values and norms and itself ot en acts as a model for values. 101 
However, EU value importation through law is far from uncontroversial. 
For example, there is a view that in the realm of terrorist i nancial trans-
actions the EU has largely adopted international law measures wholesale, 
 97  E.g  G.  De B ú rca , ‘EU External Relations: h e Governance Mode of Foreign Policy’ in  B. 
 Van Vooren ,  S.  Blockmans and  J.  Wouters (eds.),  h e EU’s Role in Global Governance: 
h e Legal Dimension ( Oxford University Press ,  2012 ) . 
 98  See  D.  Bodansky and  G.  Shaf er , ‘ Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International 
Law ’ ( 2012 )  1  Transnational Environmental Law  1 . 
 99  See  P.  Zumbansen , ‘ Transnational Legal Pluralism ’ ( 2010 )  1 (2)  Transnational Legal 
h eory  141 . 
 100  See above, n. 70. 
 101  Cremona, ‘Values in EU Foreign Policy’, p. 285. h e European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees are examples of the former; 
the evolution of the legal order of ASEAN might represent the latter. See also Cremona, 
‘h e Union as a Global Actor’; Pech, ‘Rule of Law as a Guiding Principle’. 
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which has been critiqued as an unduly ‘blind’ absorption. 102 Of course, the 
use of international norms in internal EU policy-making in the realm of 
counterterrorism is far from unprecedented or unprincipled. h e norma-
tive reasons for such adoption are usually well intentioned, for example 
ostensibly high legal standards or benchmarks from best international 
practice, or a desire to establish compliance at international level by using 
standards from such a forum. 103 
 h e theme of exportation of EU values has a very broad interpreta-
tion and considerable span of subject areas beyond security. 104 For exam-
ple, all forms of EU trade agreements contain value commitments and 
value exportations, but they are controversial and have been haphazardly 
applied. 105 Legal scholarship asserts across a broad range of subject areas 
that there is much l uidity and uncertainty concerning the importation 
and exportation of values in EU law. Seen in this light, the transposition 
of transatlantic rules into EU law seems entirely comprehensible, or at 
the least similarly l uid. Nevertheless, in the area of security, transatlantic 
relations represent a tricky balance of powers, where the EU has jointly 
agreed to particular value commitments, similarly entered into by the 
USA. Legal scholarship has engaged with this phenomenon of the bal-
ance of powers in transatlantic relations in security more readily than 
rule-transfer. 
 Many have provided accounts mapping specii c imbalances or uneven-
ness of the rule-making between the EU and US legal orders in the post 
9/11 period as considered here. h is specii c context renders any ef ort to 
subsequently transpose transatlantic standards, de facto and  de jure , into 
EU law all the more challenging. As discussed above, transatlantic secur-
ity rules derived from the post-9/11 period are perceived to have emanated 
from a peculiarly complex legal and political context. Whilst a future 
problem, the legal review of the emerging EU internal security law with 
its origins in EU–US relations remains problematic. Evidently, the appro-
priate place for redress, justiciability and fundamental rights generally in 
security rules is far from settled. h e phenomenon of rule-transfer pos-
sibly adds a signii cant dimension to our understanding of transatlantic 
 102  E.g.  O.  Bures ,  EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? ( Aldershot :  Ashgate ,  2011 ) . 
 103  E.g., M. Scheinin (ed.),  European and United States Counter-terrorism Policies, the Rule 
of Law and Human Rights , EUI RSCAS Policy Papers (2011/03). 
 104  See also  S.  Lucarelli , and  I.  Manners (eds.),  Values and Principles in EU Foreign Policy 
( London :  Routledge ,  2006 ) . 
 105  h e EU has suspended agreements on fundamental grounds only in a minority of 
instances: See De Witte, ‘h e EU and International Legal Order’, p. 143. 
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relations outside of the bilateral context and proximity between the legal 
orders of the EU and USA. It is suggested here that it warrants being part 
of a future research agenda, one that is only canvassed here rather than 
developed. It indicates a richer context to transatlantic relations outside 
the strictly bilateral context, but one also in need of close analysis and 
rel ection, especially in security. In this regard, the interactions between 
the EU and US legal orders outside of the bilateral context operate in the 
background to the ambiguity and malleability of transatlantic rule-trans-
fer. It is yet again a signii cant aspect of contemporary transatlantic rela-
tions outside of the bilateral context and further reason to adopt a larger 
view of what could be considered to be a contemporary Atlantic commu-
nity of law. 
 Conclusion 
 h is account has explored what the phenomenon of an Atlantic commu-
nity of law actually entails in contemporary times. h e account has sought 
to develop its exploration descriptively and perhaps rather tentatively, as 
part of a future research agenda. It has sought to show how there are many 
recent interactions and rule-making exercises between the EU and US 
legal orders that demonstrate that transatlantic relations could be under-
stood as quasi-institutional rather than law-light and institution-light. 
Many recent interactions between the legal orders of the EU and USA take 
place in unconventional forums and ways, explicable through and even as 
a result of quasi-institutionalisation and/or, at the very least, high proxim-
ity existing between the two legal orders. However, there are boundaries 
to this proximity. A more conventional analysis of bilateral agreements 
in post 9/11 justice and home af airs cooperation suggests serious lim-
its to the idea of proximity between legal orders, along with major legiti-
macy issues. Paradoxically, newer cooperation suggests higher proximity 
between the legal orders of the EU and USA. Such a thesis is echoed by 
the development of transatlantic rule-transfer and borne out in particular 
in new EU security measures, the latter warranting further exploration. 
h is account also forms the basis for rel ections on our understanding 
of the character of real world interactions between legal orders, not least 
across the Atlantic and possibly also their legitimacy. 
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